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Abstract
The bytecode veriﬁcation is a key point of the security chain of the Java Platform. This feature is
optional in many embedded devices since the memory requirements of the veriﬁcation process are
too high. In this paper we propose a veriﬁcation algorithm that remarkably reduces the use of the
memory by performing the veriﬁcation during multiple specialized passes. The algorithm reduces
the type encoding space by operating on diﬀerent abstractions of the domain of types. The results
of the experiments show that this bytecode veriﬁcation can be performed directly on small memory
systems.
Keywords: Embedded systems, data-ﬂow analysis, type correctness
1 Introduction
The Java programming language was born in the early 90s in order to meet
ﬂexible and highly reliable smart electronic device programming requirements.
It is used in a growing number of ﬁelds and lately also in the embedded sys-
tem world. Among the embedded devices, Java Cards represent an interesting
research challenge since they have limited resources but require high security
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features. Actually, a Java Card is a Smart Card running a Java Virtual Ma-
chine (VM), the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM), and it is going to become
a secure token in various ﬁelds, such as banking and public administration.
The JCVM is the core of the Java Card: it is a software CPU with a stack-
based architecture that creates an execution environment between the device
and the programs (Java Card Applets). The JCVM guarantees hardware-
independence and enforces the security constraints of the sandbox model. In
particular, the Java bytecode Veriﬁer is one of the key components of the
sandbox model: the Java Card Applets are compiled in a standardized com-
pact code called Java Card bytecode and the Veriﬁer checks the correctness
of the code before it is executed on the JCVM.
The Java bytecode Veriﬁer performs a data-ﬂow analysis on the bytecode
in order to ensure the type-correctness of the code. For example, it ensures
that the program does not forge pointers, e.g. by using integers as object
references.
Bytecode veriﬁcation enables post issuance download of Java Card Applets,
even if they are not taken from the card vendor but from diﬀerent sources.
Bytecode veriﬁcation can be performed oﬀ-card or on-card. However, because
of the strong memory constraints of the Java Cards, the bytecode veriﬁcation
is unfeasible directly on-card in its standard form.
To perform veriﬁcation on-card, many approaches have been proposed in
the literature: they modify the standard veriﬁcation process so that its imple-
mentation becomes suitable for memory constrained devices. These proposals
are reviewed in Section 3.1.
In this paper, we propose and evaluate an alternative approach that is
based on checking if the bytecode is correct by means of a progressive analysis
that requires much less memory than the standard one.
2 Standard bytecode veriﬁcation
The result of the compilation of a Java program is a set of class ﬁles: a class
ﬁle is generated by the Java Compiler for each class deﬁned in the program.
A Java Card applet is obtained by transforming the class ﬁles into cap ﬁles
in order to perform name resolution and initial address linking [3]. Hereafter,
we will refer to the class ﬁles only, since cap ﬁles and class ﬁles conceptually
contain the same information.
A class ﬁle is composed by the declaration of the class and by the JVM
Language (JVML) bytecode for each class method. The JVML instructions
are typed: for example, iload loads an integer onto the stack, while aload
loads a reference.
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The Veriﬁer performs a data-ﬂow analysis of the code by executing ab-
stractly the instructions over types instead of over actual values. A Java
bytecode veriﬁcation algorithm is presented in [8]: almost all existing byte-
code Veriﬁers implement that algorithm. The veriﬁcation process is performed
method per method: when verifying a method, the other methods are assumed
to be correct. Figure 1 shows the JVML instructions. We assume that sub-
routines have a unique return address. The following notation is used for the
types:
BasicType = {int ,ﬂoat , . . .};
ReferenceType = ReferenceObject | ReferenceArray;
AddressType = ReferenceType | ReturnAddress;
β ∈ BasicType;
τ¯ ∈ {reference} ∪ BasicType;
τ ∈ {Object} ∪ BasicType;
[τ ∈ ReferenceArray;
C ∈ ClassType.
The types form a domain, where  is the top element and ⊥ is the bottom
element. In this domain  represents either an undeﬁned type or an incorrect
type.
Class types C are related as speciﬁed by the class hierarchy. Figure 2
shows an example of class hierarchy: E, F and G are user deﬁned classes, with
F and G extending E. Not all types are shown.
Each method is indicated by an expression of the form C.m(τ1, . . . , τn) : τr,
where C is the class which method m belongs to, τ1, . . . , τn are the argument
types and τr is the type of the return value. Each method is compiled into a
(ﬁnite) sequence of bytecode instructions B. We use B[i] to indicate the i-th
instruction in the sequence, with B[0] as the entry point.
Figure 3 shows the rules of the standard veriﬁcation algorithm. Each rule
has a precondition, which contains a set of constraints, and a postcondition,
which contains the transition from the before to the after state of an instruc-
tion. For example, an iload x instruction requires a non-full stack and the
int type to be associated to register x; its eﬀect is to push int onto the stack.
We have used λ to indicate the empty stack and, to simplify, the rules show
only the constraints on the types.
The goal of the veriﬁcation is to assign to each instruction i a mapping
M i from the registers to the types, and a mapping si from the elements in the
stack to the types. These mappings represent the state Sti = (M i, si) in which
the instruction i is executed. A state Sti is computed as the least upper bound
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βop :β′ Takes two operands of type β from the stack, and pushes the result
(of type β′) onto the stack.
βconst d Loads a constant d of type β onto the stack.
τload x Loads the value of type τ from register x to the stack.
τ¯store x Takes a value of type τ¯ from the stack and stores it into register x.
ifcond L Takes a value of type int from the stack, and jumps to L if the value
satisﬁes cond
goto L Jumps to L.
new C Creates an instance of class C and adds a reference to the created
instance on top of the stack.
newarray τ Creates an instance of an array of class τ and adds a reference to the
instance on top of the stack.
βaload Takes an array reference and an integer index from the stack. The
array reference is of type [β. Loads on the stack the reference of type
β saved on the index position in the referenced array.
βastore Takes an array reference, an integer index and a reference from the
stack. The array reference is of type [β, the reference of type β. The
reference is saved in the referenced array on the index position.
aaload Takes an array reference and an integer index from the stack. The
array reference is of type [C. Loads on the stack the reference of
type C saved on the index position in the referenced array.
aastore Takes an array reference, an integer index and a reference from the
stack. The array reference is of type [C, the reference of type C.
The reference is saved in the referenced array on the index position.
getfield C.f :τ Takes an object reference of class C from the stack; fetches ﬁeld f
(of type τ) of the object and loads the ﬁeld on top of the stack.
putfield C.f :τ Takes a value of type τ and an object reference of class C from the
stack; saves the value in ﬁeld f of the object.
invoke C.m(τ1, . . . , τn) :τr
Takes the values v1, . . . , vn (of types τ1, . . . , τn) and an object refer-
ence of class C from the stack. Invokes method C.m of the object
with actual parameters v1, . . . , vn; places the method return value
(of type τr) on top of the stack.
τreturn Takes the value of type τ from the stack and terminates the method.
jsr L Places the address of the successor on the stack and jumps to L.
ret x Jumps to the address speciﬁed in register x.
Fig. 1. Instruction set
of all the interpreter states Qi = 〈i, M, s〉 obtained while applying the rules.
The rules are applied within a standard ﬁxpoint iteration which uses a worklist
algorithm. Until the worklist is not empty, an instruction B[i] is taken from
the worklist and the states of the successor program points are computed. If
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Fig. 2. Some types and the subtyping relation. Not all types are shown.
the computed state for a successor program point j changes (either the state
at j has not been computed yet or the state already computed diﬀers), B[j]
is added to the worklist. The ﬁxpoint is reached when the worklist is empty.
Initially, the worklist contains only the ﬁrst instruction of the bytecode. The
initial types on the stack and registers represent the state at the method
entrance: the stack is empty and the type of the registers are set as speciﬁed by
the method signature (the registers not associated with the method arguments
hold the undeﬁned type ).
As a consequence of the algorithm, the state at a program point of the
instructions that represent a merge point between control paths (i.e. having
more than one predecessor in the control ﬂow graph) is the least upper bound
of the after state of all the predecessors. If, for example, register x has type
int on a path and type  on another path, the type of x at the merge point
is . The least upper bound of stacks and memories is done pointwise. The
pointwise least upper bound between stacks requires stacks of the same height
(otherwise there is a type error).
3 On-card bytecode veriﬁcation
The veriﬁcation algorithm is expensive for both computation time and memory
space since a data-ﬂow analysis of the code is performed. The before state of
each instruction must be recorded during the analysis. As an optimization,
Sun’s bytecode Veriﬁer maintains the state of each program point that is either
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op
B[i] = βop : β ′, v1  β, v2  β
〈i, M, v1v2s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, β
′s〉
const
B[i] = τconst d
〈i, M, s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, τs〉
load
B[i] = τload x, M(x)  τ
〈i, M, s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, M(x)s〉
store
B[i] = τ¯store x, v  τ¯
〈i, M, vs〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M [x/v], s〉
aload
B[i] = τaload, v1 = [v
′, v′  τ, v2  int
〈i, M, v1v2s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, v
′s〉
astore
B[i] = τastore, v1 = [v
′, v′  τ, v2  int , v3  τ
〈i, M, v1v2v3s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, s〉
iftt
B[i] = ifcond L, v  int
〈i, M, vs〉 −→ 〈L, M, s〉
ifﬀ
B[i] = ifcond L, v  int
〈i, M, vs〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, s〉
Fig. 3. The rules of the standard veriﬁer.
the target of a branch or the entry point of an exception handler [7]. The set
of states saved during the data-ﬂow analysis is called dictionary.
The on-card bytecode veriﬁcation is identical to a standard veriﬁcation,
however special optimizations must be used since cards have limited resources.
Commercial 2004 Java Cards typically provide 1-4KB of RAM, 32-64KB of
persistent writable memory and 128-256KB of ROM. Only the RAM should
be used to store temporary data structures because the persistent memory is
too slow and allows a limited number of writing cycles.
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goto
B[i] = goto L
〈i, M, s〉 −→ 〈L, M, s〉
new
B[i] = new C
〈i, M, s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, Cs〉
newarray
B[i] = newarray τ, v  int
〈i, M, vs〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, [τs〉
getﬁeld
B[i] = getfield C.f :τ, v  C
〈i, M, vs〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, τs〉
putﬁeld
B[i] = putfield C.f :τ, v1  τ, v2  C
〈i, M, v1v2s〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, s〉
invoke
B[i] = invoke C.m(τ1, . . . , τn) :τr, vj  τj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), v  C
〈i, M, v1 · · · vnvs〉 −→ 〈i + 1, M, τr〉
return
B[i] = τreturn v  τ, v  τr
〈i, M, v〉 −→ 〈−1, M, λ〉
jsr
B[i] = jsr L
〈i, M, s〉 −→ 〈L, M, ras〉
ret
B[i] = ret x, M(x)  ReturnAddress
〈i, M, s〉 −→ 〈ra, M, s〉
Fig. 4. The rules of the standard veriﬁer (continued).
3.1 Related work
Many approaches have been presented to develop an on-card Veriﬁer.
Rose and Rose [11] propose a solution based on a certiﬁcation system
(inspired by the PCC, ‘Proof Carrying Code’ work by Necula [10]). The
veriﬁcation process is split in two phases: lightweight bytecode certiﬁcation
(LBC) and lightweight bytecode veriﬁcation (LBV). LBC is performed oﬀ-
card and produces a certiﬁcate that must be distributed with the bytecode.
LBV is performed on-card, and it is a linear veriﬁcation process that uses the
certiﬁcate to assure that the bytecode is safe. LBV is currently used in the
KVM of Sun’s Java 2 Micro Edition.
Leroy, in [6], proposes to reduce memory requirements with an oﬀ-card
code transformation, also known as ‘code normalization’. The transformed
code complies with the following constraints: every register contains the same
type for all method instructions and the stack is empty at the merge points.
The veriﬁcation of a ‘normalized’ code is not expensive: only one global state
is required since the type of the registers never change.
Deville and Grimaud [4] propose to use the persistent memory for storing
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the data structures needed for the veriﬁcation process. Their strategy holds
all data structures in RAM as long as possible, and swaps them in persistent
memory when RAM space is missing. A special type of encoding is proposed
since persistent memory cells have a limited number of writing cycles.
A veriﬁcation algorithm that reduces the size of the dictionary by allocating
dynamically its entries has been presented in [2]. The algorithm assigns a life-
time to the dictionary entries, splits the method code into control regions [5]
and analyzes the regions one-by-one. Each region is analyzed by applying
the standard veriﬁcation algorithm: the size of the dictionary is reduced since
unnecessary entries are never kept in the memory.
4 Our approach
In this paper we present a space-aware bytecode veriﬁcation algorithm that
reduces the size of the dictionary by performing a progressive analysis on
diﬀerent abstractions of the domain of types.
4.1 The multipass concept
The multipass veriﬁcation algorithm is the standard algorithm performed in
many specialized passes. Each pass is dedicated to a type. The dictionary size
is reduced since, during each pass, the abstract interpreter needs to know only
if the type (saved in a register or in a stack location) is compatible with the pass
or not. The compatibility of the type is given by the type hierarchy. Actually,
only one bit is needed to specify the type of the data saved in registers and
stack locations.
The analysis is performed on the whole bytecode for every pass. The
number of passes depends on the instructions contained in the method: one
pass is needed for each type used by the instructions. Additional passes are
also needed to check the initialization of objects (this concept is explained in
Section 4.4).
The multipass veriﬁcation is possible since the bytecode instructions are
typed and the number of types is limited: basic types (int, byte, ...), reference
types (the ones listed in the constant pool) and return address type.
An example of data-ﬂow analysis (dfa) performed with the standard ap-
proach and with the multipass approach is shown in Figure 5. We can notice
the diﬀerent encoding strategies for the two approaches: during the standard
dfa the types are fully speciﬁed. On the other hand, during each multipass
dfa pass, a one bit encoding of the types is used.
C. Bernardeschi et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 141 (2005) 237–254244
    0: iload_0
    1: getstatic AA.h I
    4: if_icmpne 13
    7: getstatic AA.c [I
  10: iconst_0
  11: iaload
  12: istore_1
  13: getstatic AA.c [I
  16: iconst_1
  17: iaload
  18: istore_1
  19: iconst_1
  20: ireturn
static int  debit ( int  aC)
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 { 0 0 }
 ( )
 ( 0 )
 ( 0 0 )
 ( )
 ( 1 )
 ( 0 1 )
 ( 0 )
 ( )
 ( 1 )
 ( 0 1 )
 ( 0 )
 ( )
 ( 0 )
array of int
(registers)    (stack)
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 0 }
 { 1 1 }
 { 1 1 }
 ( )
 ( 1 )
 ( 1 1 )
 ( )
 ( 0 )
 ( 1 0 )
 ( 1 )
 ( )
 ( 0 )
 ( 1 0 )
 ( 1 )
 ( )
 ( 1 )
   int
(registers)     (stack)
MULTIPASS DFA
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int T }
 { int int }
 { int int }
 ( )
 ( int )
 ( int int )
 ( )
 ( [int )
 ( int [int )
 ( int )
 ( )
 ( [int )
 ( int [int )
 ( int )
 ( )
 ( int )
STANDARD DFA
(registers)             (stack)
Fig. 5. An example of standard data-ﬂow and multipass data-ﬂow.
4.2 The rules
First we formulate the operations performed by the standard Veriﬁer and then
we give a formal description of the multipass algorithm.
Deﬁnition 4.1 [transition system] A transition system L is a triple (Q,→
, Q0), where Q is a set of states, Q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and −→⊆ Q×Q
is the transition relation.
We say that there is a transition from Q to Q′ if (Q,Q′) ∈−→, and we
write Q −→ Q′. We denote with
∗
−→ the reﬂexive and transitive closure of
−→. We say that a state Q ∈ Q is a ﬁnal state of the transition system if and
only if no Q′ exists so that Q −→ Q′ (we write Q −→).
Let D be the set of types, V the set of registers, A the set of bytecode
addresses, I the set of bytecode instructions, M : V → D the set of memories
(M associates a type to every register) and S the set of ﬁnite sequences of
elements of D (S associates a type to every element in the stack locations).
An interpreter state is deﬁned as a triple 〈i, M, s〉, where i ∈ A, M ∈M and
s ∈ S. Given a method m, we deﬁne Bm : A → I as the instruction sequence
of the method. We assume that a lattice L = (D,) of types is deﬁned (it is
shown in Figure 2). The  relation is extended pointwise to the sets M, S.
4.2.1 Standard rules
The rules shown in Figure 3 deﬁne a −→⊆ Q×Q relation.
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Given a method C.m(τ1, . . . , τn) : τr, which contains a bytecode sequence
B, we deﬁne the initial memory M0 ∈ M such that M0(0) = C, M0(i) = τi
if 1 ≤ i ≤ n and M0(i) =  otherwise (M0 assigns types to the registers
according to the method parameters). We deﬁne with (Q,−→, 〈0, M0, λ〉)
the transition system deﬁned by the rules in Figure 3, starting from the initial
state 〈0, M0, λ〉.
This transition system is an abstract interpretation of the execution of the
bytecode. The Veriﬁer implicitly uses this abstract interpretation to associate
a state with each instruction of the bytecode. During the data-ﬂow analysis,
the state associated to the instruction at oﬀset i is Sti = (M i, si), where
(M i, si) is the least upper bound of memories and stacks of all the interpreter
states 〈i, M, s〉 that appear in the transition system.
The standard Veriﬁer gives an error if, starting from state 〈0, M0, λ〉, it
produces a 〈i, M, s〉 state where no further transition can be made and i = −1.
Formally, we write: 〈0, M0, λ〉 
∗
−→
4.2.2 Multipass rules
We are now going to give a formal description of the multipass algorithm.
For each pass type p ∈ D, we deﬁne a lattice Lp = (Dp,p), where Dp =
{p,⊥p} and ⊥p p p. We deﬁne also function αp : D → Dp as:
αp(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
⊥p if t  p
p otherwise
which means that the abstraction of a type t is ⊥p if and only if t is assignment
compatible with type p of the pass.
For example, if t ∈ C, the abstraction function for class type E (refer to
the lattice in Figure 2) is the following:
αE(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
⊥E if t ∈ {F, G, null}
E otherwise
The αp function is extended pointwise to the sets M and S. We deﬁne
a (Qp,−→p, 〈0, M
0
p , λ〉) transition system for each p ∈ D type, where Qp =
〈i, Mp, sp〉 ∈ Qp,Mp ∈Mp : V → Dp, sp ∈ Sp.
Each transition relation −→p of the multipass is obtained by the corre-
sponding standard transition relation (deﬁned in Figure 3) simply by applying
the αp function to the types and by changing each  into p. The multipass
rules are shown in Figure 6. Some rules are explained hereafter.
Let us take into consideration a βop :β ′ instruction: iadd. In this case β =
int and β ′ = int . The constraints to be checked are v1 p αp(int) and v2 p
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opp
B[i] = βop :β ′, v1 p αp(β), v2 p αp(β)
〈i, M, v1v2s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp(β
′)s〉
constp
B[i] = τconst d
〈i, M, s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp(τ)s〉
loadp
B[i] = τload x, M(x) p αp(τ)
〈i, M, s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, M(x)s〉
storep
B[i] = τ¯store x, v p αp(τ¯)
〈i, M, vs〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M [x/v], s〉
aloadp
B[i] = τaload, v1 p αp([τ), v2 p αp(int)
〈i, M, v1v2s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp(τ)s〉
astorep
B[i] = τastore, v1 p αp([τ), v2 p αp(int), v3 p αp(τ)
〈i, M, v1v2v3s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, s〉
ifp
tt
B[i] = ifcond L, v p αp(int)
〈i, M, vs〉 −→p 〈L, M, s〉
ifp
ﬀ
B[i] = ifcond L, v p αp(int)
〈i, M, vs〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, s〉
Fig. 6. The rules of the multipass veriﬁer.
αp(int). Notice that the constraints may fail only during the int pass, since
αp(int) = ⊥int if and only if p = int . If the top and next-to-top positions of the
stack contain valid types (i.e. ⊥int) then the rule is successfully applied and
the transition is performed: 〈i, Mint , ⊥int⊥ints〉 −→int 〈i+1, Mint , ⊥ints〉. For
the iadd instruction, if the pass is diﬀerent from int, the αp function returns
int , thus the constraints are always satisﬁed and therefore the transition
is performed. Also notice that when pass p is diﬀerent from int, the iadd
instruction always places p on the stack, since αp(int) = p if p = int . Now
let us suppose that there is a type error in the bytecode. The iadd instruction,
for example, may have found a type that is diﬀerent from int on the stack top:
the before state would have been 〈i, Mint , int⊥ints〉. The multipass rule ﬁnds
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gotop
B[i] = goto L
〈i, M, s〉 −→p 〈L, M, s〉
newp
B[i] = new C
〈i, M, s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp(C)s〉
newarrayp
B[i] = newarray τ, v p αp(int)
〈i, M, vs〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp([τ )s〉
getﬁeldp
B[i] = getfield C.f :τ, v p αp(C)
〈i, M, vs〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp(τ )s〉
putﬁeldp
B[i] = putfield C.f :τ, v1 p αp(τ ), v2 p αp(C)
〈i, M, v1v2s〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, s〉
invokep
B[i] = invoke C.m(τ1, . . . , τn) :τr, vj p αp(τj) (1 ≤ j ≤ n), v p αp(C)
〈i, M, v1 · · · vnvs〉 −→p 〈i + 1, M, αp(τr)〉
returnp
B[i] = τreturn, v p αp(τ ), v p αp(τr)
〈i, M, v〉 −→p 〈−1, M, λ〉
jsrp
B[i] = jsr L
〈i, M, s〉 −→p 〈L, M, αp(M(x))s〉
retp
B[i] = ret x, M(x)  αp(ReturnAddress)
〈i, M, s〉 −→p 〈ra, M, s〉
Fig. 7. The rules of the multipass veriﬁer (continued).
the type error in pass p = int , since constraint v1 p αp(int) is not satisﬁed.
Let us take in consideration a τload x instruction: aload. In this case
τ = ReferenceType. As a consequence, the constraint in the rule is M(x) p
αp(ReferenceType). The constraint may fail only during the ReferenceType
pass, since αp(ReferenceType) = ⊥p if and only if ReferenceType  p. If the
constraint fails then the abstraction of the type found in register x was not
compatible with a reference type.
Notice that the aload and the astore instructions have asymmetric behav-
iors since the aload does not work on the ReturnAddress type (diﬀerent pre-
ﬁxes have been used in the rules for these two instructions). The βop, τconst,
ifcond, newarray, τload and τ¯store instructions are always checked during
one pass. The other instructions may require operands of diﬀerent types, thus
their constraints are possibly checked in more than one pass.
4.2.3 The aaload instruction
The aaload instruction needs some additional explanation. The instruction
loads the elements contained in array of references on the stack: it takes an
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index and an array reference from the stack and pushes a reference to the
array element on the stack. For instance, if during the veriﬁcation process the
type of the array reference is [A, then the type placed on the stack by the
aaload is A.
During the standard veriﬁcation, the return type is inferred by examining
the type of the array reference on the stack; on the other hand, during the
multipass veriﬁcation the type is inferred by the pass type. Since the type
returned by the aaload is diﬀerent from the one of the operands, the multi-
pass Veriﬁer checks the type returned in a diﬀerent pass. In particular, the
aaload type returned can be checked only during the ReferenceType pass since
the type is computed by inspecting only the instruction preﬁx: the aaload
instruction embeds no detailed class information of the array of references it
is going to work with.
The rule of the standard Veriﬁer places a value of type C on the stack,
the multipass interpreter places αp(ReferenceType). The standard interpreter
can compute class C since the array reference on the stack is of type [C.
The correct type in the multipass should have been αp(C), but it cannot be
computed with the types stored in the stack of the multipass.
Some type-correct bytecodes may not be accepted because of the loss of
precision, nevertheless, we can notice that arrays of references are actually
never used in Java Card applets. The loss of precision can be solved, for
example, by specializing the analysis for each array of the reference type, and
by using a two bits type encoding in order to analyze the array references and
the array elements in the same pass.
4.3 The correctness
Now we are going to prove that bytecodes rejected by the standard Veriﬁer are
also rejected by the multipass Veriﬁer. The following deﬁnitions and lemmas
are used.
Deﬁnition 4.2 [safety] Given p ∈ D, we deﬁne a binary relation safep ∈
Q×Qp as:
Q safep Qp iff αp(Q) p Qp
which means that Q is safely approximated by Qp if and only if αp(Q) p
Qp (i.e. αp(M) p Mp and αp(s) p sp). We naturally extend the safep
relation to transition systems.
The following Lemma states that ∀p, αp is an homomorphism:
Lemma 4.3 (homomorphism) Given a state Q = 〈i, M, s〉, if Q −→ Q′
then ∀p ∈ D, ∃Q′p such that αp(Q) −→p Q
′
p and αp(Q
′) p Q
′
p
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Proof (Sketch) By cases on the rules of Figure 3 
Notice that the abstraction loses precision when αp(Q
′) p Q
′
p [12].
Lemma 4.4 (monotonicity) Given p ∈ D and two states Q1p = 〈i, M
1
p , s
1
p〉
and Q2p = 〈i, M
1
p , s
2
p〉 such that Q
1
p  Q
2
p, if ( Q
1
p −→p Q
1
′
p and Q
2
p −→p Q
2
′
p )
then Q1
′
p  Q
2
′
p .
Proof (Sketch) By cases on the rules of Figure 6 
The homomorphism and the monotonicity properties guarantee that the
standard transition system is safely approximated by the multipass transition
system obtained with the αp function [12].
Lemma 4.5 ∀p ∈ D, (Q,−→, 〈i, M0, λ〉) safep (Qp,−→p, 〈i, αp(M
0), λ〉).
Proof. By Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 
The following Lemma deﬁnes a property of the αp function.
Lemma 4.6 Given v1, v2 ∈ D, if v1  v2 ⇒ ∃ p :αp(v1) p αp(v2).
Proof. Choose p = v2. It is αv2(v1)  αv2(v2) by deﬁnition of αp since, if
v1  v2, then αv2(v1) = v2 v2 ⊥v2 = αv2(v2) 
The following theorem states that if the standard Veriﬁer gives an error,
then ∃p such that −→p gets stuck.
Theorem 4.7 〈0, M0, λ〉 
∗
→ ⇒ ∃p : 〈0, αp(M
0), λ〉 
∗
−→p.
Proof (Sketch) Given that 〈0, M0, λ〉 
∗
→, there exists a ﬁnal state Q =
〈i, M, s〉, with i = −1; from Lemma 4.5, we know that, for each p, Qp =
〈i, Mp, sp〉 exists so that Q safepQp. Then, for each possible ﬁnal state Q,
we have to show that there exists p such that Qp is also ﬁnal. The proof
proceeds by cases: B[i] must be one of the instructions enumerated in the
rules of Figure 3. Only one rule (two if the instruction is an if) could be
applied to make a transition from Q. Since Q is ﬁnal, the corresponding rule
cannot be applied: this means that either the preconditions are not met, or
the form of the before state in the transition does not match with Q. The
following reasoning must be repeated for each rule. It is easy to show that, if
Q does not match the before state of the transition, the form of Qp does not
match in the corresponding multipass rule, so Qp is ﬁnal (for every p). If a
precondition is not met, we note that all the preconditions, in Figure 3, are
of form v  v′, with v taken from the before state (in a register or on the
stack) and v′ ﬁxed by the instruction. The corresponding constraint in Figure
6 becomes v¯ p αp(v¯
′), where v¯ is taken from the corresponding position in
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the (abstract) before state. From the deﬁnition of the safep relation, we know
that, for each p, αp(v) p v¯ and, by Lemma 4.6, we know that ∃p¯ such that
v  v′ ⇒ αp¯(v) p¯ αp¯(v
′). Thus, we must have v¯ p¯ αp¯(v
′). This implies that
state Qp¯ does not meet a precondition in the (only) rule that could be used
to make a transition, so it is a ﬁnal state. 
4.4 Checking object initialization
The creation of a new object is a single statement in the Java programming lan-
guage: the statement provides object allocation and initialization. However,
in the bytecode the object initialization must be checked since the objects are
created during two distinct phases. The ﬁrst phase is allocation of the space
in the heap, the second is object initialization. In particular, the new instruc-
tion allocates the space and the call to the appropriate constructor <init>
performs the object initialization. The Veriﬁer checks that the objects are not
initialized twice and that they are not used before they have been initialized
[9].
Notice that references to multiple not-yet-initialized objects may be present
in the stack locations and in the registers: when the constructor in called, it
must know which reference points to which object in order to initialize them
correctly. The standard veriﬁcation algorithm uses a special type to keep trace
of the uninitialized objects [9]. The special type contains the bytecode position
of the new instruction that creates the object instance.
The multipass analysis requires an additional pass for each class type:
uninitialized objects of a given class are traced within a pass. A data struc-
ture that holds information about the instance of uninitialized objects is also
needed. It should be noted that uninitialized objects must not be present in
the stack locations and in the registers when a backwards branch is taken [9].
This last constraint simpliﬁes structure of the data needed during the multi-
pass: its size is constant and the object initialization can be resolved with the
FIFO strategy.
5 Experimental Results
A prototype tool has been developed by using the open-source BCEL/JustIce
package [1]. BCEL (ByteCode Engineering Library) is a set of APIs that pro-
vides an object-oriented view of the binary class ﬁles. JustIce is a bytecode
Veriﬁer. The prototype is a modiﬁed version of JustIce: the main modiﬁ-
cations have been made to specialize the data-ﬂow engine for the multipass
process. It is available at http://www.ing.unipi.it/ e o1833499.
The prototype has been tested with many methods. Hereafter we are
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package method targets dictionary size
(standard | multipass)
com.aelitis.azureus.core.peermanager.utils.PeerIDByteDecoder
jasper.Jasper
jasper.Code_Collection
com.gemplus.purse.Purse
com.sun.javacard.impl.AppletMgr
com.sun.javacard.jcasm.ParserTokenManager
org.jgraph.graph.DefaultEdge$DefaultRouting
PeerIDByteDecoder
recurseClasses
< init >
appInitDebit
createApplet
jjMoveStringLiteral
route
64
54
108
15
18
82
14
4.3 KB
1.3 KB
2.4 KB
0.97 KB
1.21 KB
7.92 KB
0.99 KB
0.18 KB
0.05 KB
0.10 KB
0.04 KB
0.05 KB
0.33 KB
0.04 KB
Fig. 8. Dictionary size of some methods.
presenting the statistics relevant to ﬁve applications: 1) Azureus, an open-
source peer-to-peer application: it contains a large number of network and
identiﬁcation methods; 2) JGraphT, an open-source mathematical library; 3)
Jasper, a class ﬁle disassembler; 4) the Java Card Runtime Environment; 5)
the Pacap prototype, an Electronic Purse application.
The statistics include the number of targets and size of the dictionary for
the standard and multipass veriﬁcation. As expected, the size of the multipass
veriﬁcation dictionary is more than ten times smaller than the size of the
standard veriﬁcation dictionary. All the space gained is due to the encoding
of the types: 1 bit for the multipass, 3 bytes for the standard.
Figure 8 reports the size of the dictionary during the veriﬁcation process
of methods belonging to the examined packages (the space overhead for the
dictionary indexing is not taken into account). The dictionary size is computed
as T × (H + N) × E, where T is the number of targets, H and N are the
maximum stack height and the maximum register number, E is the number of
bytes needed to encode the types. The standard veriﬁcation of some methods
requires more than 2KB of RAM and, for complex methods, 4KB of RAM are
not suﬃcient. On the other hand, the multipass veriﬁcation comfortably ﬁts
in 1KB of RAM for all the examined methods. Moreover, it should be noted
that the dictionary usually contains many duplicated states when the number
of targets is very high: the one bit encoding of the types reduces the number
of possible states thus, in some cases, the dictionary size can be optimized by
avoiding state duplication [2].
Some considerations on the time needed to perform a complete multipass
veriﬁcation can be made. We analyzed the number of passes needed for each
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method in order to perform a complete multipass veriﬁcation: it depends on
the instructions contained in the method and, in many cases, it is less than
what we expected simply by analyzing the constant pool. For the methods
we have tested, the total number of types (types in the constant pool and
basic types) was 26.7 in average, while the number of types actually used
in the methods was only 5.8 (22%), in average. We should also consider
that each pass of the multipass Veriﬁer is much simpler than the standard
one: in particular, the multipass veriﬁcation always compares bits, while the
standard one usually needs to traverse the class hierarchy in order to compute
the results.
6 Further work and conclusions
In this paper we presented an approach for bytecode veriﬁcation that optimizes
the use of the system memory and we have proved that it is correct in relation
to the standard data-ﬂow analysis. The approach reduces the space for the
type encoding by executing multiple passes and by verifying a single type at
each pass. It should be noted that, by increasing the number of bits used
to encode the types, the multipass analysis can be performed on more than
one type during each step. In particular, the multipass analysis can be ﬁne-
tuned on the card characteristics. The multipass approach is general and
potentially applicable to diﬀerent optimizations and application areas. For
example it can be used to improve the time performances of data-ﬂow analysis
on multi-processor systems. In a multipass strategy, each processor could
analyze the whole code for a diﬀerent abstraction and the analysis could be
fully parallelized.
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